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FEDERALISM AND ANTITRUST REFORM
Abstract
Currently the Antitrust Modernization Commission is considering
numerous proposals for adjusting the relationship between federal antitrust
authority and state regulation. This essay examines two areas that have
produced a significant amount of state-federal conflict: state regulation of
insurance and the "state action" immunity for general state regulation. It argues
that no principle of efficiency, regulatory theory, or federalism justifies the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which creates an antitrust immunity for state regulation
of insurance. What few benefits the Act confers could be fully realized by an
appropriate interpretation of the state action doctrine. Second, the current
formulation of the antitrust state action doctrine creates approximately the correct
balance between state and federal authority where competition is concerned,
although both its "clear articulation" and "active supervision" prongs need to be
strengthened and refined. In addition, basing state action immunity on the
degree to which a state imposes the burden of in-state monopoly on out-of-state
interests very likely comes with greater costs than any benefit that is likely to
result.

FEDERALISM AND ANTITRUST REFORM
Herbert Hovenkamp1
Introduction: State Regulation and Federal Antitrust
Ever since the Sherman Act was passed, the interaction between federal
antitrust policy and state law making has been controversial. The framers of the
Sherman Act clearly did not intend to displace all state regulation of the
economy.2 To be sure, under the "dual federalism" that prevailed in the 1890s,
Congress could have done little else.3 In that era any attempt to regulate purely
intrastate economic affairs would have exceeded Congressional power under the
Commerce Clause, as the Supreme Court's decision in the Sugar Trust case a
few years later established.4 For their part, the states were empowered to
regulate purely instrastate transactions, but not those with a significant interstate
impact.5 Within this model there were very few perceived overlaps6 and
1.

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.

2.

See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); and 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&102, 216 (3d ed. 2006); Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and
American Law, 1836-1937 at 241-295 (1991); James May, The Role of the States in the
First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust Policy, 59 Antitrust L.J.
93 (1990); James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev.
495 (1987).
Cf. R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal.App.3d 653, 660, 112 Cal.Rptr. 585,
589 (1974) ("history of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it clear that Congress did not
intend that the federal legislation preempt parallel state efforts to control unfair competitive
practices").
3.

See Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note 2 at 79-92. The classic statements concerning the
limitations on state and federal power under the Commerce Clause in the nineteenth
century are Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite,
chs. 1 & 2 (1937); and Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev.
1 (1950). For a good, brief history see Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying
the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1447, 1454 (1995).
4.

United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Sherman Act does not reach
sugar trust that manufactured in multiple states when the restraint was not claimed to be in
the interstate shipment of sugar).
5.

See Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Rwy. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (while state
could regulate rates of a completely intrastate rail shipment, it lacked the power to regulate
any portion of an interstate shipment, even that part contained entirely within the state).
See Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note 2 at 79-84.
6.

Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note 2 at 79-92.

Congress really had no choice but to recognize the power of the states to engage
in economic regulation within their own boundaries.
Nevertheless, even within this regime, conflicts could arise. Already in
1904 the Supreme Court had to face a "state action" defense to a government
antitrust challenge. The Northern Securities corporation had taken advantage of
a provision of the New Jersey Corporation Act that permitted the creation of a
holding company that held out-of-state assets.7 The result was a merger of the
two most significant east-west interstate railroads in the northern part of the
United States. The defendants argued that the Sherman Act was not intended to
overrun state law. Because the merger in question was justified by state
corporation laws it could not violate the antitrust laws. However, the Sherman
Act permitted the government to pursue "combinations" in restraint of trade,
making no distinction between purely private combinations8 and those that were
formed with the sanction of a state government. The Supreme Court rejected
this "state action" defense in only a few sentences, concluding that while the New
Jersey statute permitted holding companies, there was no evidence that it was
intended to permit anticompetitive combinations. The Court also added that "It
cannot be said that any state may give a corporation . . . authority to restrain
interstate . . . commerce against the will of . . . Congress."9
The antitrust "state action"10 doctrine in its modern form was made
necessary by the collapse of dual federalism in the 1940s, particularly with the
Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn,11 which expanded federal
economic power to reach predominately intrastate transactions provided that
they "affected" United States commerce. At that point, significant conflict
between federal antitrust and state regulation became possible. The Supreme

7.

Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 326-327 (1904).

8.

E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (condemning
privately created joint venture among railroads under Sherman Act); United States v. JointTraffic Ass'n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898). Both Trans-Missouri and Joint-Traffic involved joint
"running arrangements," which were joint ventures that did not require the formation of a
new corporation or the sanction of state corporate law.
9.

Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 346.

10.

The antitrust "state action" doctrine is different from and much narrower than the
Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine, and the two are rarely confused. The
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine automatically extends to all states and government
subdivisions, as well as their officials acting under color of state law and occasionally even
private entities performing public functions. In contrast, the antitrust state action immunity
applies only where the requirements of clear articulation and active supervision of private
conduct have been met. All further references to "state action" in this paper are to the
antitrust doctrine.
11.

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942).

Court responded a year later with Parker v. Brown,12 which created the antitrust
state action doctrine, immunizing a state-sanctioned agreement that reduced the
output of California raisins.
While the state action doctrine was entirely a creation of the Supreme
Court, the views of Congress during this period were largely sympathetic. In
South Eastern Underwriters, decided two years after Wickard and a year after
Parker, the Supreme Court held that insurance transactions were within
interstate commerce and thus within the reach of the Sherman Act.13 Congress
then responded in 1945 with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which immunized the
"business of insurance" from most federal legislation, including the antitrust
laws.14 McCarran-Ferguson is significant in part because in 1945, when that
statute was passed, Congress clearly did have the power to reach intrastate
transactions with interstate effects, thus overriding inconsistent state mandates.
However, Congress largely chose not to do so with respect to insurance,
preferring at that time to leave most of its regulation to the states.
Thus in the space of four years in the early 1940s the Supreme Court and
Congress established what has become the modern framework for
understanding the relationship between federal antitrust policy and regulation by
the states. The question today is whether this framework still works, or whether it
needs to be modernized or jettisoned completely. This essay offers a few basic
considerations and some suggestions for reform. The considerations are these:
Changing Attitudes Toward Regulation and the Role of Antitrust
The relationship between federal antitrust policy and state economic
regulation is driven in part by attitudes toward regulation. Although the point is
easily overstated, today we are less optimistic about regulation than we were a
half century ago. The state action exemption was formulated at a time when
federal power was expanding rapidly and confidence in regulation was generally
high.15 By contrast, in the last quarter century we have become much less
confident in regulation at every government level. The rise of public choice
12.

317 U.S. 341 (1943).

13.

United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The
decision substantially overruled the Court's decision in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183
(1868), that insurance had an essentially intrastate character. In Paul the Court concluded
that a Virginia statute requiring out of state insurance companies to obtain a license before
doing business in Virginia did not offend either the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the
Commerce Clause.
14.
15.

59 Stat. 33 (1945), 61 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. ''1011, 1012.

On some of the historical perspective see 1A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &241 (3d ed. 2006).

theory and the deregulation movement reflect different aspects of these
changes.16 Just as these changes have occasioned less deference to federal
regulation, they can do the same thing for state or local government regulation.
One is tempted to say that during this same period we have acquired
more confidence about the role of antitrust as an alternative to affirmative
regulation in producing efficient economic outcomes. But that point is open to
dispute, and some critics take just as dim a view of antitrust enforcement as they
do of regulation.17 To be sure, deregulation has increased the domain of antitrust
by removing regulatory immunities that once existed.18 As a result, antitrust is
now applied in markets such as air passenger travel or telecommunications
where there was once thought to be a substantial regulatory immunity. But to
say that antitrust's domain has expanded is not necessarily to say that our
confidence level in antitrust enforcement has increased as confidence in
regulation has declined. One might as easily say that our confidence level in all
types of government intervention in the market has declined, and that the decline
cuts across both regulatory and antitrust policy.
Actually, the antitrust story is more nuanced than this. While we have
become far more skeptical about our once aggressive policies against
exclusionary practices, vertical restraints and mergers, antitrust policy is as fierce
as ever about naked cartels. Problematically, however, the types of restraints for
which state law regulatory immunity is sought run the full gamut. Some state
regulation condones fairly blatant collusion.19 However, antitrust challenges to
state action are frequently brought under the weakest possible antitrust
theories.20 For example, it is hard to see any antitrust violation in a city's order to
the dominant cable company to restrain its expansion for a time so that the city
16.

See id., &241b2 (public choice); &241b3 (changes in economic theory arguing for
deregulation). More generally, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public
Choice: a Critical Introduction (1991). For specific application to regulation, see George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 3 (1971); and
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 335
(1974).
17.

E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1984);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4,
16 (1984).
18.

See 1A Antitrust Law &241 (3d).

19.

E.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (noting weak state supervision
of title insurance rate bureaus, leading effectively to unsupervised collusion); New England
Motor Rate Bureau, Inc., 112 F.T.C. 200 (1989), vacated on other grounds, 908 F.2d 1064,
1071 (1st Cir. 1990) (similar facts); Massachusetts Board of Registration of Optometry, 5
Trade Reg. Rep. &22,555 (1988). See 1A Antitrust Law &226c (3d).
20.

See 1 Antitrust Law &228b (3d).

might assess whether entry by rivals is appropriate;21 or a municipality's refusal
to supply utilities to outlying areas that had not been annexed;22 or its decision to
create its own cable television system rather than purchasing CATV services
from a private firm.23 Many other state action cases involve challenges to such
things as exclusive contracts, ordinarily treated as either exclusive dealing or
tying. The great majority of such arrangements are lawful even when the firm
imposing the arrangement is a monopolist, and in many of these cases the
hospital or similar publicly operated institution claiming the exemption was only
one of many competitors.24 Still others are challenges to such practices as peer
review which are rarely anticompetitive unless abused.25 Others involve
standard setting or rule making that cannot be an antitrust violation because no
benefit accrues to the organization making the rules.26
Some see the rise of public choice theory as a compelling reason for
either narrowing the reach of the state action immunity or for removing the
immunity for proven instances of regulatory capture.27 However, it is not clear to
21.

Community Communic. Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The
municipal ordinance challenged as an antitrust violation delayed the territorial expansion of
the plaintiff, the dominant incumbent cable firm, while the city council decided whether to
open the field to additional competitors. In all events, a dominant firm alleging that a
restraint limited its power to expand its monopoly so that new rivals could be given an
opportunity to come in is not a victim of antitrust injury. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); and see 2 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law &337 (2d 2000).
22.

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985). Placed in a private context,
the claim in Hallie was tantamount to claiming that General Motors violated the antitrust
laws by providing snow removal services only to its own properties, but not to adjoining
properties that it did not own.
23.

Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 963 (1992).
24.

E.g., Jackson, Tennessee Hospital Company, LLC v. West Tennessee Healthcare,
Inc., 414 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2005); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810,
824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990).
25.

E.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp., 980 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1993).

26.

Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Public Accountants of Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033, 1043
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998) (state accountancy board promulgates rule
prohibiting CPAs, its own members, from selling securities).
27.

E.g., John T. Delacourt & Todd Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views
on the Proper Role of Government, 72 Antitrust L.J. 1075 (2005). Other good discussions
include John Shephard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
713 (1986); William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v.
Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 Duke L.J. 618; William H. Page & John
E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 189 (1993); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of

me that antitrust tribunals need to respond in any programmatic way to changes
in regulatory attitude. Repairing imperfections in political processes is not
antitrust's purpose. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever
authorized the use of antitrust as a wide ranging mandate to fix imperfections in
government process. Rather, the antitrust laws are explicitly designed to control
private restraints. Further, most serious abuses of government process are
better remedied by laws that are more directly tailored for that purpose, such as
those condemning bribery, financial abuses or other forms of corruption. These
laws do not carry antitrust's additional, significant proof requirements of market
power and economic harm, and at least some of them are enforceable by
criminal sanctions.
Public choice is relevant in another sense, however. Public choice theory
serves as a warning that many so-called "public" restraints are really private
restraints by another name. That message is two-fold: if a state or local
government really authorizes and effectively supervises a private restraint, so be
it. Federal antitrust cannot intervene simply because federal tribunals believe
that the regulation in question is ill-advised, inefficient, or a manifestation of
interest group capture. However, antitrust need not countenance restraints in
which the effective decision makers are the market participants themselves.28
Concerns for Federalism
Pulling in the opposite direction, the trimming of the federal regulatory
agenda has been accompanied by a return to federalism -- i.e, to take
preemptive regulatory power away from the federal government and restore it to
the states. This would seem to suggest more deference by federal antitrust
tribunals to state regulation, and thus an expanded role for state action immunity.
Concerns for federalism were not particularly prominent in the Supreme
Court's Parker decision. Rather, the Court seemed to regard the regulation in
question as enacted in the public interest.29 In sharp contrast, the first edition of
the Areeda-Turner Antitrust Law treatise, published in 1978, seated the state
action doctrine squarely within the authors' concerns for federalism. Areeda and
Turner argued that the "proper" grounds for state action immunity were twofold.
First, there should not be Parker immunity "without adequate public supervision"

the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic
Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jorde,
Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism,
75 Cal. L. Rev. 227 (1987).
28.

See discussion infra.

29.

See Parker, 317 U.S. at 346, 351-352. On this point, see Delacourt & Zywicki, note

27.

of private conduct.30 Second, there must be "authorized state action clearly
intended to displace antitrust law."31 The Supreme Court picked up these criteria
almost verbatim in its Midcal Aluminum decision three years later, and since then
"clear authorization" and "active supervision" have come to define the two
elements for the state action doctrine, at least when the conduct in question is
that of private parties.32
Thus it seems clear that, while the initial Parker v. Brown state action
doctrine rested on ideas about regulatory supremacy rather than federalism,
today that is no longer the case. Since Midcal neither the Supreme Court nor the
lower courts have indulged any presumption that state regulation is in the "public
interest," or that it produces better outcomes than the antitrust laws would
produce. Rather, the foundation of the doctrine lies in discernment of the state's
own commitment to regulate. If that commitment is appropriately stated, then the
federal tribunal should not intervene no matter what it may think of the merits of
the regulation at issue.
Growth of Multistate Markets; Spillovers
The enlargement of markets and internationalization of the economy that
provided the backdrop for the expansion of federal regulatory power in the 1930s
30.

1 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law &&213 (1978). The title of this
Paragraph was "Proper Immunity Limits I: No Parker Immunity Without Adequate Public
Supervision," and Areeda and Turner that:
...a state may be free to determine for itself how much competition is desirable, provided
that it substitutes adequate public control wherever it has substantially weakened
competition.
... [T]he adequate supervision criterion ensures that state-federal conflict will be avoided
in those area in which the state has demonstrated its commitment to a program
through its exercise of regulatory oversight. At the same time, it guarantees that
when the Sherman Act is set aside, private firms are not left to their own devices.
Rather, immunity will be granted only when the state has substituted its own
supervision for the economic constraints of the competitive market.
id. at 72-73 (footnotes omitted).
31.

See id., &214, which was titled "Proper Immunity Limits II: No Parker Immunity
Without Authorized State Action Clearly Intended to Displace Antitrust Law."
32.

California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. (Midcal), 445 U.S. 97
(1980). See 1 Antitrust Law &221f (3d). Under the post-Midcal case law the conduct of
private parties must be both authorized and supervised. The conduct of the "state itself" is
inherently authorized and need not be supervised. The conduct of officials representing
state subdivisions, such as municipalities or most agencies, must be authorized but need
not be supervised. For elaboration see 1 Antitrust Law &&221-227 (3d).

and 1940s has not subsided. To the contrary, the rise of electronic markets has
only served to accelerate the pace at which markets have become at least
national and often international or even global. As a general proposition,
regulation of large markets by small governments is inefficient because it results
in excessive self dealing and protectionism.33
Applications: McCarran-Ferguson and "State Action"
McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Immunity: the Case for Repeal
When the McCarran-Fergson Act was passed in 1945 state regulation of
insurance was significant, extending to such things as rates, coverage, and
financial integrity.34 The South Eastern Underwriters case35 threatened to
undermine state regulation by permitting federal antitrust to be inserted into a
market that had traditionally been reserved for the states. The first paragraph of
Justice Black's opinion for the Court defined the issue:
For seventy-five years this Court has held, whenever the question has been
presented, that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution does not deprive
the individual states of power to regulate and tax specific activities of
foreign insurance companies which sell policies within their territories.
Each state has been held to have this power even though negotiation and
execution of the companies' policy contracts involved communications of
information and movements of persons, moneys, and papers across state
lines. Not one of all these cases, however, has involved an Act of
Congress which required the Court to decide the issue of whether the
Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power to regulate insurance
transactions stretching across state lines. Today for the first time in the

33.

Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal
Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L.Rev. 719 (1985).
34.

See Robert H. Jerry, Understanding Insurance Law '21 (2d ed. 1996), noting that by
1919 36 states had "departments" or commissions charged with regulating insurance. By
1930 these agencies had been given authority to collect information from insurers and to
review at least some business decisions and approve some forms. See also John G. Day,
Economic Regulation of Insurance in the Untied States 18 (1970) (by 1944 there was
substantial state agency involvement in the process of insurance rate regulation). On
specific instances of state regulation, see, e.g., American Druggists Fire Ins. Co. of
Cincinnati, Ohio v. State Ins. Bd. of Okl., 184 Okla. 66, 84 P.2d 614 (1938). See also
Hassler v. Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 48 N.W.2d 343 (1951); Caminetti v. Manierre, 23
Cal.2d 94, 142 P.2d 741 (Cal. 1943); United Employers Cas. Co. v. Pearlman Auto Parts &
Supply Co., 173 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943); English Freight Co. v. Knox, 180 S.W.2d
633 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944).
35.

United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

history of the Court that issue is squarely presented and must be
decided.36
The South Eastern Underwriters case itself involved allegations of pricefixing among a half dozen insurers serving several states, as well as an
agreement to boycott rivals and force purchasers to deal only with the
defendants. The McCarran-Ferguson Act would have immunized the first of
these claims, provided that insurance was adequately regulated, but its "boycott"
exception would probably have denied immunity to the second.37
Notwithstanding its then recent decision in Parker the South Eastern
Underwriters opinion took a much less accommodating attitude toward state
regulation:
[I]t is argued at great length that virtually all the states regulate the
insurance business on the theory that competition in the field of insurance
is detrimental both to the insurers and the insured, and that if the Sherman
Act be held applicable to insurance much of this state regulation will be
destroyed. The first part of this argument is buttressed by opinions
expressed by various persons that unrestricted competition in insurance
results in financial chaos and public injury. Whether competition is a good
thing for the insurance business is not for us to consider. Having power to
enact the Sherman Act, Congress did so; if exceptions are to be written
into the Act, they must come from the Congress, not this Court.
The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many state
laws regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go so far
as to permit private insurance companies, without state supervision, to
agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates. No states authorize
combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate, and boycott
competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged, and it cannot be
that any companies have acquired a vested right to engage in such....38
Congress then responded with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which was intended
to restore the state regulatory prerogative. The Act exempted the insurance

36.

United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 434 (1944).

37.

The Act contains an exception for boycotts. See 15 U.S.C. '1013b: "Nothing
contained in this chapter shall render the ... Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to
boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." See 1 Antitrust
Law &220 (3d).
38.

Ibid. (emphasis added), citing Parker as an example of a situation where the state did
authorize such combinations.

industry from federal laws of general application, and included an antitrust
exemption that applied if the insurance business was regulated by state law.39
In 1945, when the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, Congress
apparently did not foresee subsequent developments in the antitrust state action
doctrine that would have served to immunize many insurance restraints, provided
that they were adequately regulated. Indeed, the state action doctrine would
have provided a much more balanced approach to the problem of ineffectual
state insurance regulation.
One of the ironies of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that it tends to
immunize practices that pose a significant threat to competition, such as
competitor agreements fixing rates or reducing policy coverage,40 but not various
vertical practices that are almost certainly not antitrust violations at all. By its
terms the statute applies only to the "business of insurance," which involves such
things as the making of rates or the determination of policy coverage. On the
other hand, purely vertical arrangements under which insurers provide
prescription drugs or other non-insurance services or engage in peer review of
providers are frequently held to fall outside the "business of insurance," and thus
are non-immune. The same thing is true of insurer efforts at cost control via
limitations of such things as auto repair prices.41 In sum, the statute tends to
immunize serious horizontal restraints while finding no immunity for vertical
restraints that are far less likely to be anticompetitive.
39.

The Act provides that:

No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance: Provided, That ... [the antitrust laws and FTC Act]
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law.
15 U.S.C. '1012b.
40.

See, e.g., Gilchrist v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327 (11th
Cir. 2004) (immunizing agreement among insurers to require use of inferior replacement
crash parts in auto repair).
41.

See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) (peer review not
immune); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (no
immunity for health insurer's agreement with pharmacies setting maximum rates for
prescriptions for its insureds). See also Brillhart v. Mutual Med. Ins., Inc.., 768 F.2d 196,
200 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (provider agreement between insurer and physicians; latter agreed
to provide medical services to subscribers at price to be determined by insurance
company); St. Bernard Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 618 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980)
(contract limiting reimbursement of plaintiff for-profit hospital to average charges of nonprofit hospitals); Liberty Glass Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1979) (auto
glass repairer challenged insurer's cost-control arrangements involving other repairers).

While the statute seems to allow for broader application of the antitrust
laws to insurance than other federal provisions,42 the courts have not read it that
way. Further, the phrase "regulated by state law" in the McCarran-Ferguson Act
has come to mean something quite different than the "authorization" and "active
supervision" required by the state action doctrine. To illustrate, suppose that the
state has insurance regulation in place, but the general thrust of this regulation is
to oppose horizontal agreements fixing insurance premiums. In such a case one
might say that a Sherman Act complaint alleging unlawful price fixing would be in
furtherance of rather than inconsistent with the state's regulatory policy.
Nevertheless, the courts generally agree that the Sherman Act complaint is preempted. The mere presence of state regulation is sufficient to oust the federal
antitrust claim.
In addition, the courts have generally been satisfied with virtually any
degree of regulation, and even the most superficial indicators of supervision.43
They have suggested that the mere existence of an agency or official with
insurance oversight is adequate regulation.44 The Ninth Circuit believes that the
mere fact that the state has appointed an insurance commissioner and required
him to approve all policies is sufficient.45 In another case it inferred sufficient
42.

The debates indicate that Congress intended to leave more room for antitrust
enforcement against the insurance industry than for the application of other laws not
explicitly directed at the insurance industry. See e.g., 91 Cong. Rec. 1444 (remarks of Sen.
Pepper), id. at 1484 (Sen. Murdock).
43.

See Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1975) (Alabama
statute prohibiting "all unfair methods of competition" sufficient regulation to create
McCarran immunity); Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972) ("there is nothing in the language of the McCarran
Act or in its legislative history to support the thesis that the Act does not apply when the
state's scheme of regulation has not been effectively enforced"). See also Gilchrist v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding immunity
for alleged insurer agreement reducing quality of repair parts; noting that Florida, the most
relevant state, regulated the general industry intensely, and that many states also regulate
the use of non-OEM repair parts).
44.

See, e.g., For example, FTC v. National Casualty 357 U.S. 560, 564-565 (1958),
refused to inquire into how state regulatory provisions were applied, with the possible
exception where the regulation was a "mere pretense." Accord Ocean State Physicians
Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1108-1109 (1st Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990); Workers Compensation Insurance, 867 F.2d
1552, 1557-1558 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989); Health Care Equalization
Comm. v. Iowa Med. Socy., 851 F.2d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 1988).
45.

Freier v. New York Life Ins. Co., 679 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Proctor
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 317 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839
(1982) (not disturbing district court finding that virtually any regulation specifically
mentioning insurance industry will suffice).

regulation from the fact that a state statute banned unfair or deceptive practices
in the health insurance industry.46 The courts have not required authorization of
the specific conduct that is the subject of the antitrust challenge.47 The Eighth
Circuit has held that a statute giving the state power to "investigate" rates and
methods of competition was sufficient regulation to support the immunity, even if
there was no evidence that actual investigating was occurring.48
In sum, the McCarran-Ferguson immunity requires no "active supervision"
of private conduct at all, and only the most general statement of authorization,
certainly nothing like the authorization requirement in the state action doctrine.
While principles of federalism may require that federal antitrust authority
yield on matters where a state has made clear its wish to regulate, no principle
mandates such yielding to little more than naked private power. One can protest,
of course, that today many states regulate their insurance markets vigorously
and are constantly on the lookout for abuses. But in those situations repeal
would not be harmful, for the state action immunity would protect the results.
Furthermore, the idea expressed by the Supreme Court in Paul v.
Virginia49 that insurance is largely a matter of state contract law is not close to
the reality we live in today.50 Insurance is very largely sold in multistate or even
46.

Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
1287 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
47.

E.g., Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Socy. of the U.S., 503 F.2d 725, 728 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975) (simple statute regulating unfair practices in
insurance industry sufficient, regardless of "whether the... laws proscribe or permit the
alleged acts of economic coercion in the issuance of insurance policies" challenged in this
case).
48.

Workers Compensation Insurance, 867 F.2d 1552 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
920 (1989). A dissenting judge objected: "Given Minnesota's intentional deregulation of
workers' compensation rates, I would find that Minnesota does not 'regulate' these rates for
purposes of . . . McCarran-Ferguson. While the state did maintain a general regulatory
presence in the field, there was no specific regulation targeted at the alleged practices at
issue. . . ." Id. at 1569.
49.

Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868). See discussion supra.

50.

Indeed, the interstate character of the insurance industry was already clear in the
1940s, when South Eastern Underwriters was decided. See this description from Justice
Black's opinion for the Court, 322 U.S. at 541-542:
This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compartments which function in
isolation from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and integration of
activities in all the states in which they operate are practical aspects of the
insurance companies' methods of doing business. A large share of the insurance
business is concentrated in a comparatively few companies located, for the most
part, in the financial centers of the East. Premiums collected from policyholders in

national markets. While this fact may not make state regulation unimportant, it
exacerbates the possibility of socially harmful spillovers.
In sum, repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act need not have any harmful
consequences for federalism or the competitive health of the insurance industry.
Bona fide regulatory oversight will continue to qualify the industry for the state
action exemption, provided that the authorization and supervision requirements
are met.
Reform of the Antitrust "State Action" Doctrine
The current Parker state action immunity doctrine could be improved in
several ways. First, too many courts interpret the authorization requirement far
too broadly. In Midcal the Supreme Court required "clear articulation" and
"affirmative expression" of a state intent to authorize the "challenged restraint."51
Writing a few years prior to Midcal, Areeda and Turner expressed this
requirement as a "clear statement" rule that presumed lack of immunity unless
the relevant statute stated its intent clearly.52
every part of the United States flow into these companies for investment. As
policies become payable, checks and drafts flow back to the many states where the
policyholders reside. The result is a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse
among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy
obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are essential
to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts. Individual policyholders living in
many different states who own policies in a single company have their separate
interests blended in one assembled fund of assets upon which all are equally
dependent for payment of their policies. The decisions which that company makes
at its home office--the risks it insures, the premiums it charges, the investments it
makes, the losses it pays--concern not just the people of the state where the home
office happens to be located. They concern people living far beyond the boundaries
of that state.
51.

California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980).

52.

See 1 Areeda and Turner, Antitrust Law, note 30 at &214:

the determination of both the meaning of state approval and the extent of state
authorization must be subject to a clear statement requirement. Adoption of a
policy requiring a state to make a clear statement of it intention to supplant
competition reconciles the interests of the states in adopting non-competitive
policies with the strong national policy favoring competition, and is consistent with
the canon of federal statutory construction that exemptions to the antitrust laws are
not to be lightly inferred. Where there is no other indication of the proper scope of
an officer's authority or of the meaning of state approval, a clear statement
requirement is the best approach, because it ensures that the strong federal policy
embodied in the antitrust laws will not be set aside where not intended by the state,
and yet also guarantees that the state will not be prevented by the antitrust laws
alone from supplanting those laws as long as it makes its purpose clear....

After a few years of restrictive interpretations of this requirement the
Supreme Court loosened it up, finding in Hallie that it was sufficient if the restraint
was a "foreseeable result" of the regulatory authorization.53 Since Hallie the
trend in the lower courts has been to interpret state statutes generously so as to
find authorization. Indeed, the courts have gone so far as to infer clear
articulation from such things as the granting of ordinary corporate powers -inferring, for example, that a general grant of the corporate power to make
contracts authorized a public hospital's anticompetitive exclusionary contracts.54
Other decisions have properly been much more restrictive. One court
very wisely rejected the argument that courts should infer:
a policy to displace competition from naked grants of authority. These are the
enabling statutes by which myriad instruments of local government across
the country gain basic corporate powers. To infer a policy to displace
competition from, for example, authority to enter into joint ventures or
other business forms would stand federalism on its head. A state would
henceforth be required to disclaim affirmatively antitrust immunity, at the
peril of creating an instrument of local government with power the state did

The clear statement requirement does not prevent the state from indicating its interest,
as it can always make its intent clear. It merely ensures that the inertia in the
system is used in the service of the federal interest in free competition.
Id. at 91-92 (footnotes omitted).
53.

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985). Accord City of Columbia
& Columbia Outdoor Advertising v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373
(1991).
54.

See Martin v Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996) (municipal
hospital's exclusive contract with physician to supervise kidney disease center was
foreseeable consequence of state statute authorizing such hospitals to contract for the
provision of services, including entering management contracts, but not explicitly stating
that such contracts could be exclusive); Jackson, Tennessee Hospital Co., LLC v. West
Tennessee Healthcare, Inc., 2004-1 Trade Cases &74,344, 2004 WL 547215 (Feb. 27,
2004) (authority to enter into contracts with physicians implied authority to enter into
anticompetitive agreements). See also See Recombinant DNA Technology and Patent
Contract Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Ind. 1994), holding that a statute authorizing a
university to "acquire by grant, purchase, gift, devise, lease, or by the exercise of the right
of eminent domain, and ... hold use, sell, lease, or dispose of any real or personal property
necessary for the full exercise or convenient or useful for the carrying on of any of its
powers. . . ." authorized it to agree with a private firm to obtain an exclusive patent license
by fraud. No doubt the court was impelled by serious doubts of any antitrust violation; but if
there were one, a statute giving a university a general power to acquire, manage and
dispose of property hardly includes anticompetitive agreements in violation of federal
antitrust law as a foreseeable consequence.

not intend to grant. The immediate practical effect would be the extension
of the Parker principle downward, contrary to the teaching that local
instruments of government are subject to the Sherman Act.55
Although Hallie permitted an inference of authorization to be drawn from
foreseeability, the inference that the Supreme Court drew in that case was not a
particularly long stretch. The City of Eau Claire was accused of refusing to
provide sewage treatment services to unincorporated areas around it unless
these areas first agreed to be incorporated. The authorizing provision that the
City relied on expressly permitted the City to refuse to provide services to
unincorporated areas,56 but it did not expressly authorize anticompetitive actions
or antitrust violations. Likewise, in Columbia the Supreme Court found it
sufficiently foreseeable that a grant of power to regulate the land use process
contemplated the power to control the type and placement of advertising
billboards.57 In sharp contrast, all corporations are granted the power to enter
into contracts, but this hardly expresses a "clear articulation" of the state's desire
that they be permitted to enter into anticompetitive agreements.58
As a general rule ambiguities in state authorizing provisions should be
construed against authorization. This conclusion flows from the fact that the
antitrust laws declare a clear national policy of preventing anticompetitive
55.

Surgical Care Center of Hammond v. Hosp. Svce. Dist., 171 F.3d 231, 235-236 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999). The court refused to find authorization from
legislation that gave a hospital the power to contract and to enter into joint ventures with
other health providers. As it noted, "[n]ot all joint ventures are anticompetitive. Thus, it is
not the foreseeable result of allowing a hospital service district to form joint ventures that it
will engage in anticompetitive conduct." Accord Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope
Valley Hospital District, 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992).
56.

See Wis.Stat. '66.069(2)(c) (1981-1982), providing that a city providing a public

utility:
may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance
shall delineate the area within which service will be provided and the municipal
utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond the area so delineated.
Further, Wis.Stat. '144.07(1) (1981-1982) provided that the state's Department of
Natural Resources may require a city to interconnect with surrounding areas; however, it
also provided that such an order would be void if the outlying territory refused to become
annexed to the city. See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41.
57.

City of Columbia & Columbia Outdoor Advertising v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
499 U.S. 365 (1991).
58.

See the FTC's state action Task Force Report, which would inquire "whether the state
has deliberately adopted a policy to displace competition in the manner at issue." FTC,
Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003) at 50-51 (2003).

restraints, and that most states declare a similar policy via their own antitrust
laws or regulatory provisions. As a result state and local government regulatory
policy is painted on a canvas in which federal and state policies favoring
competition form a clear background. While the Parker doctrine rests on the
premise that a state is free to deviate from this policy in specific situations if it
chooses, such deviations should not be found absent a clear expression by the
state that it desires to do so.59 When a state grants power to an inferior entity it
presumably grants the power to do the thing contemplated, but not to do so
anticompetitively. For example, an authorization to a corporation to enter into
contracts is not to be construed as an authorization to enter into price-fixing or
other anticompetitive agreements unless the authorizing provision states so
clearly.
The problem with the "active supervision" requirement has not been quite
as severe since the Supreme Court's decision in Ticor Title60 establishing that
active supervision requires actual government review of private conduct.61
Nevertheless, there are still problem areas. For example, there is much to be
said for the FTC's suggestion that if a state regulatory agency is going to approve
a particular instance of rate bureaus or other forms of regulatory price fixing it
should issue a written opinion on the merits, supported by a set of fact findings
that explain its decision.62 Such reasoned elaborations serve to provide
transparency to the process and help ensure that agency decisions do not reflect
simple private interest capture.63 This prong of the Midcal test requires that the
59.

When a state wishes to, its authorization can be very clear. Consider this Georgia
statute:
It is declared by the General Assembly of Georgia that in the exercise of powers specifically
granted to them by law, local governing authorities of cities and counties are acting
pursuant to state policy. . . . This chapter is intended to articulate clearly and
express affirmatively the policy of the State of Georgia that in the exercise of such
powers, such local governing authorities shall be immune from antitrust liability to
the same degree and extent as enjoyed by the State of Georgia."
O.C.G.A. '36-19-1 (April 4, 1984). See McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649, 655
(11th Cir. 1992) ("by enacting [this provision] Georgia unequivocally revealed that it
contemplated that its municipalities might engage in anticompetitive conduct.").
60.

FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

61.

However, see Comment, William J. Martin, State Action Antitrust immunity for
Municipally Supervised Parties, 72 Univ.Chi.L.Rev. 1079 (2005) (arguing that the courts
analyze claims of state supervision rigorously, while applying a much more lenient standard
to local government supervision).
62.
63.

See Task Force Report, note 58 at 55.

See Timothy J. Muris, Clarifying the State Action and Noerr Exemptions, 27 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 443, 448 (2005).

state both "have and exercise ultimate authority"64 so that it can be said that the
resulting decision is a product of "deliberate state intervention, not simply by
agreement among private parties."65
Whenever we consider the values of federalism and the respective roles
of state and federal regulation, some attention must be given to the problem of
spillovers, or extraterritorial effects. It is one thing to approve an anticompetitive
state regulatory scheme when the burden falls substantially on that state's own
residents. But federalism does not require federal authority to permit states to
export anticompetitive regulatory schemes. Under the current formulation of the
state action exemption, extraterritorial impact of state regulatory schemes is not
even regarded as relevant. To be sure, antitrust is not the only vehicle for
addressing these problems. Anticompetitive state regulatory schemes that have
too severe an impact on interstate commerce can and have been struck down
under the Commerce Clause.66
The Federal Trade Commission's Report of its State Action Task Force is
quite concerned about extraterritorial spillovers of anticompetitive state
regulation.67 As that document observes, the spillover problem has long been
recognized in the academic literature.68 However, the Report then noted only
Parker itself as a decision that involved significant spillovers.69
64.

Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 106 (1988). See 1A Antitrust Law &226c (3d).

65.

Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634-636.

66.

E.g., Granholm v. Heald, 125 S.Ct. 1885 (2005) (ban on out-of-state wine shipments
violates commerce clause); South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999)
(discriminatory franchise tax levied on out-of-state corporations violated commerce clause);
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (use tax exemption that favored instate sellers of natural gas did not violate either commerce clause or equal protection
clause); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (striking down North Carolina tax on
residents' ownership of out of state corporate shares); Associated Indus. of Missouri v.
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994) (striking down tax on value of goods purchased outside the
state but consumed, used, or stored inside the state); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951) (statute prohibited sale of milk as pasteurized unless processed within
five miles of Madison).
67.

FTC, Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003) at 4044, 56-57 (2003).
68.

Id., citing Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust StateAction Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory
Federalism, 75 Tex.L.Rev. 1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State
Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 Cal.L.Rev. 227 (1987);
David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity, State Action and Federalism,
Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 Harv. J.L.& Pub. Pol'y 293 (1994); Einer Elhauge,
The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv.L.Rev. 668 (1991); John E. Lopatka, State action
and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 Fordham L.Rev. 23 (1984);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L.&Econ. 23 (1983);

Under the state action doctrine in its current form spillovers are simply
irrelevant to the question of antitrust illegality. If the state has sufficiently
articulated its wish to displace the antitrust laws and if private conduct is
adequately supervised, then it does not matter how much the regulatory program
in question injures those outside the jurisdiction of the state or local government
imposing the regulation. As a consequence judicial records are not developed so
as to highlight spillover effects. A coherent doctrine of spillovers and its inclusion
as a state action immunity requirement will therefore require some new directions
in case development.
But inadequate factual development in the existing case law is hardly the
only problem. The most serious difficulty is administrative. The "clear
articulation" and "active supervision" prongs of the state action doctrine are
designed to promote rapid and fairly easy disposition of antitrust challenges to
state and local government. Ideally, "articulation" can be assessed by looking at
a state's statutes, or perhaps legislative history, regulations, or occasionally case
law. Generally these things can be judicially noticed, making the authorization
requirement an ideal candidate for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
"Active supervision" can be a little more difficult, but need not be. Often the
public records provide ample evidence of supervision or the lack of it. As a
result, state action immunity questions are often resolved on motions to dismiss.
In contrast, measurement of "spillovers" in the context of antitrust litigation
would at best be an empirically challenging exercise. First, every state and local
regulation has some spillover. For example, out-of-state visitors may have to use
the trash disposal,70 taxicab,71 hospital,72 or ambulance services73 that are
Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust
Policy, 32 UCLA L.Rev. 719 (1985); William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy
Reform in Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 St. John's L.Rev. 361 (2000).
69.

See Report, note 58 at 40. The Report also noted the example given in Lafayette
that "a municipality conceivably might charge discriminatorily higher rates to such captive
customers outside its jurisdiction without a cost-justified basis." City of Lafayette v. La.
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 404 (1978). But the Report did not suggest that
significant spillovers were at issue in Lafayette.
70.

E.g., Southern Disposal, Inc. v. Texas Waste Management, Inc., 161 F.3d 1259 (10th
Cir. 1998); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1987).
71.

Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc.., 810 F.2d 869, 875 (9th
Cir. 1987); Independent Taxicab Drivers' Employees v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760
F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1986); Campbell v. City of Chicago,
823 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1987); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D.
Tex. 1978); Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994). Most of these
involved exclusive licenses for things such as airport pickup, often from large international
airports such as DFW (Woolen), Houston (Independent Taxicab Drivers), or O'Hare
(Campbell). None of the decisions mentioned interstate spillover effects.

subject to a challenged restraint. Or the resale price maintenance scheme at
issue in Midcal almost certainly affected out-of-state wine purchasers.74 But
unless we want to jettison the state action exemption altogether, these spillovers
are going to have to be regarded as de minimis, or as not sufficiently substantial
to invoke any exception to the immunity.
Beyond that, we certainly cannot expect litigants to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis tailored after the Kaldor-Hicks model of economic efficiency, asking
whether the harmful impact on out-of-state interests was larger than the benefits
conferred on in-state residents. Doing so would move the state action immunity
from one of relatively simple disposition on motions to dismiss or early summary
judgment into a litigation nightmare involving multiple experts and costly
empirical studies. It must be borne in mind that often these disputes are
relatively small in the world of antitrust cases, involving such things as a single
physician's challenge to the policies of a public hospital, or a small trash removal
firm's or taxicab operator's challenge to an exclusive franchise. Further, public
defendants such as municipalities lack the resources for costly litigation.
To be sure, one can imagine egregious situations in which the impact of
state regulation falls almost entirely on out-of-state interests, but then it seems
the dormant Commerce Clause would be sufficient to handle the problem.75
It is largely for this reason that the Antitrust Law treatise has played down
the spillover problem, even though I was one of the authors cited in the FTC's
Report as stating the spillover concern.76 Yes, it is a concern, but the most
fundamental piece of cost-benefit analysis of all is an assessment whether the
benefits of taking extraterritorial spillovers into account will be justified by the very
considerable increase in costs likely to affect most state action cases.
The authors of the FTC's Report appear to be aware of this, although they
did not explicitly articulate the concern. The Report argues that "overwhelming"
72.

Jackson, Tennessee Hospital Company, LLC v. West Tennessee Healthcare, Inc.,
414 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2005); Surgical Care Center of Hammond v. Hosp. Svce. Dist.,
171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999); Martin v Memorial Hospital at
Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996).
73.

A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc. v. County of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333 (9th Cir. 1996); Gold
Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
74.

California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).

75.

See the decisions cited supra.

76.

See FTC Report of the State Action Task Force, note 58 at (2003) at 43 n. 186, citing
Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32
UCLA L.Rev. 719 (1985).

state spillovers be taken into account in deciding the immunity question.77 The
limitation to "overwhelming" is undoubtedly intended to address the fact finding
problem, but even so, a broad factual inquiry will be required. The authors then
add in a footnote:
When the degree of spillover is more marginal, and difficult to measure,
prudence and a desire for legal rules with ex ante predictability counsel
against giving significant weight to interstate spillovers. But where the
benefits of a given anticompetitive restriction accrue overwhelmingly to
residents of the state implementing the restriction, and the harms fall
overwhelmingly on residents of other states, then the considerations
behind both the Interstate Commerce Clause and the federal antitrust laws
are at their height, and the case for judicial recognition of those spillovers
is at its strongest.78
Still, one wonders whether there will be restraints that meet this test for antitrust
purposes, but would not be excluded in any event by the dormant commerce
clause.79
Finally, antitrust tribunals need to be somewhat more sensitive to
substantive issues of antitrust policy in deciding questions that implicate the state
action immunity. Too many cases have required lengthy appellate litigation,
sometimes even to the Supreme Court, when the case could have been
disposed of far more readily on antitrust grounds. The FTC has somewhat
ambiguously suggested a "tiered" approach to the state action immunity, with a
clearer state articulation of purpose to displace the antitrust laws required as the
restraint becomes more anticompetitive.80 While one can appreciate the
77.

Report, note 58 at 56.

78.

Id. at 57 n. 242.

79.

One possibility is municipal restraints where the impact of the restraint falls outside of
the municipality but within the state. In that case, however, the issue is probably best left to
state law.
80.

See John T. Delacourt & Todd Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on
the Proper Role of Government, 72 Antitrust L.J. 1075, 1089-1090 (2005), referring to the
State Action Task Force Report, note 58 at 12. Delacourt & Zywicki suggest, id. at 1089:
Pursuant to such a tiered approach, the level of clear articulation required would increase
or decrease, depending on the nature of the anticompetitive conduct at issue. This
approach reflects that fact that, the more serious the nature of the anticompetitive
conduct, the more likely it is to restrain trade. Thus, it is logical to assume that the
alleged beneficiary of a restraint will be more likely to engage in more serious
anticompetitive conduct as such conduct is also more likely to be successful.
Increasing the level of clear articulation required to match the seriousness of the
alleged anticompetitive conduct should therefore create at least a rough link
between the defendant's incentives and a grant of state action protection, with the

underlying concern, this approach overly complicates an already complex
doctrine. It would be far better to require that articulation be clear in all cases,
under a plain statement rule. When concerns for competition seem relatively
modest, rather than watering down the articulation requirement litigants and
courts would do better to go straight to the merits. The previously mentioned
Boulder decision, which was litigated all the way to the Supreme Court, provides
a good example. Uncertain about the best course for future development of its
cable television system the City of Boulder enacted a moratorium on further
expansion of its incumbent cable television provider while it considered whether
such expansion was preferable to new entry by other providers. The complaint
should have been dismissed on the pleadings. First, the City of Boulder was not
a participant in the cable television market at all. Second, the plaintiff was
claiming an antitrust right to expand its monopoly franchise rather than permitting
the city to inaugurate competition.81
The state action immunity is essential in situations where state regulation
endorses collusion or similar practices that are almost certainly antitrust
violations when committed in the private sector. It is completely unnecessary
when a state or local government regulates in a way that never gives rise to an
antitrust cause of action to begin with. The tougher cases are a relatively small
number in the middle -- arguable rule of reason violations but a colorable case for
state authorization and active supervision. With respect to these I do not believe
that a more lenient test for immunity is the right approach; the state either
declares an intention to displace the antitrust laws or it doesn't. In most such
cases an examination of the antitrust merits would be a much quicker road to
resolution.
Conclusion
Federal antitrust policy has always been delimited by concerns for
federalism. While the role of the states in regulating their own economies is not
as significant today as it was when the Sherman Act was passed, that is no
reason for jettisoning our concerns to preserve a federal system of economic
regulation, provided that doing so is defensible on policy grounds and not too
costly. When a state regulates well, appropriately limiting the range of private
entrepreneurial discretion, then federal antitrust must ordinarily stand aside, even
though the federal decision maker thinks that the state regulatory regime in
question is poorly designed or inefficient. However, concerns for federalism do
result that the "clear articulation" requirement will be most rigorous where the
defendant is most likely to engage in anticompetitive conduct.
81.

The plaintiff also alleged a conspiracy between the City and the cable company that
wanted to enter the market to substitute the latter for the former. However, no competition
is diminished when one monopoly franchise is substituted for another one, and such
plaintiffs ordinarily lack standing. See 2 Antitrust Law &348e (2d ed. 2000).

not require the federal antitrust tribunal simply to cave in to purely private
business discretion.
To that end, the McCarran-Ferguson insurance immunity is long overdue
for repeal. That statute does virtually no good and creates an immunity whose
social cost in the form of increased collusion is undoubtedly very high. By
contrast, the Parker state action doctrine is salvageable with much more modest
fixes that leave its basic structural requirements intact.

